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ABSTRACT 14 
The construction industry, particularly in Asia, experiences disproportionately high numbers 15 
of occupational injuries and fatalities. Malaysian construction fatality rates are more than 16 
double those in developed nations. Systems thinking has previously been used to identify 17 
‘archetypal’ casual structures underpinning safety-related construction behaviours via a 18 
Grounded Theory analysis of interview data from construction safety professionals in New 19 
Zealand (Guo et al. 2015).  This paper partially replicates the method of this prior work within 20 
a different cultural context in order to further validate the method and evaluate the extent to 21 
which the previously identified structures are indeed archetypal.  Seven interviews were 22 
conducted with Malaysian construction industry professionals.  Three potential archetypal 23 
structures were identified concerning: (1) effects of a migrant workforce, (2) corporate 24 
accountability and profit driven business culture, and (3) issues in the regulatory system.  The 25 
structure of behavioural systems in Malaysian construction is depicted providing a view into 26 
the failings of construction safety management systems and the interventions to address them. 27 
Contractors’ drive for profit was determined as a primary contributing factor in most causal 28 
relationships identified.  The method is shown to be useful and evidence produced to suggest 29 
at least one of the previously proposed causal structures is archetypal.   30 
 31 
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1. Introduction 37 
Construction is a hazardous sector (Im et al., 2009; Razak, Ibrahim, Roy, Ahmed, & Imtiaz, 38 
2010; Ringen, Seegal, & Englund, 1995). It experiences a disproportionately large number of 39 
injuries and fatalities for the number of people employed, compared to other industries (Chong 40 
& Low, 2014; Ringen et al., 1995; Waehrer, Dong, Miller, Haile, & Men, 2007). Fatal 41 
occupational accidents occur much more regularly in Asian countries than more established 42 
market economies of the European Union, North America and Australasia (Hämäläinen, 43 
Takala, & Saarela, 2006; Takala, 1999).  Two economically and culturally different countries 44 
are central to the study described here, Malaysia and New Zealand.  Comparing these two in 45 
terms of construction industry fatalities shows Malaysia recorded a rate 2.6 times higher than 46 
that of New Zealand over the period between 2013 and 2017 (see Table 1).  47 
 48 
------------------------------------------------------ 49 
TABLE 1  50 
------------------------------------------------------ 51 
 52 
The danger of construction can be attributed to a variety of factors. For example, the transient 53 
nature of the workforce (often referred to as ‘mobility’) results in low skill workers being 54 
constantly introduced to the industry and moving from project to project (Fang, Chen, & Wong, 55 
2006; Guo, Yiu, & González, 2015; Lunt, Bates, Bennett, & Hopkinson, 2008; Sawacha, 56 
Naoum, & Fong, 1999). This can inhibit the cultivation of a strong safety culture. Establishing 57 
a strong, positive safety culture can be a crucial tool to assist organisations with improving 58 
safety performance (Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Cooper, 2000). Cooper (2000) 59 
defines safety culture as the “observable degree of effort by which all organizational members 60 
directs their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis”. It has become a 61 
 
 
staple in the vocabulary of those concerned with construction related accidents, due to its ability 62 
to encompass behavioural, psychological, and management factors into a single management 63 
designation (Choudhry et al., 2007).   64 
This mobility is compounded by issues arising from “decentralization” (Fang et al., 2006) in 65 
the construction industry.  This is a concept that suggests  as employees are often distributed 66 
and separated by site, they are dissociated from the regulation and planning that governs them, 67 
which, in combination with the often complex and novel working conditions present, leads to 68 
workers having to make autonomous decisions (Fang et al., 2006; P. T. Mitropoulos & Cupido, 69 
2009; Sawacha et al., 1999). Letting workers make autonomous decisions assumes that they 70 
are properly trained in their field and are skilled enough to make such choices - which is not 71 
always the case. This combination of work conditions and pressures, as well as construction 72 
crews themselves determining how work is structured and coordinated, increases the likelihood 73 
of errors arising (P. T. Mitropoulos & Cupido, 2009; Sawacha et al., 1999). Thus, due to the 74 
nature of construction, it is difficult for organisations to tackle safety with an organisational, 75 
systemic approach (Guo et al., 2015; Lunt et al., 2008). 76 
This paper explores the use of networks of cause and effect to describe construction safety 77 
behaviour, evaluating and developing the work of Guo et al. (2015) to determine whether these 78 
structures are archetypal across cultural differences. 79 
 80 
2. Background 81 
System Archetypes are the name given to a set of generic structures of cause and effect 82 
feedback loops popularised by Senge (1990). They can be used to explain and describe the 83 
common behaviours of a system (which in the context of this paper could include a construction 84 
site, company, or whole industry). Senge argues that these cause and effect feedback structures 85 
 
 
can be so influential on a system’s behaviour that almost any human actor placed in a system 86 
where those structures are present will produce the same results.   87 
Guo et al.’s (2015) research led to the fabrication of 8 System Archetypes specific to 88 
safety-related behaviours observed in the construction sector. These were based on data 89 
collected from construction professionals in New Zealand, blended with the 8 general System 90 
Archetypes created by Senge (1990). However, Guo et al. recognised that for these structures 91 
to be truly archetypal, their research must be consolidated through “future research in different 92 
cultural settings” (Guo et al., 2015). This paper attempts to validate and develop their prior 93 
research using a similar methodology within the Malaysian construction industry.  94 
 95 
2.1 Malaysian & New Zealand culture 96 
Before proceeding it is necessary to establish whether New Zealand and Malaysia do indeed 97 
provide different cultural settings.  Malaysia’s national culture features a melting pot of 98 
different ethnicities and religions, contributing to a unique and diverse culture (Ahmad, 1997).  99 
Malaysian culture can be constructed from its main constituent cultures - Malay, Chinese, and 100 
Indian. Religion is an acknowledged descriptive aspect of culture (Herskovits, 1949), therefore 101 
culture can be further derived from the main religious ideologies practiced by these groups. 102 
Table 2 shows the contrast between the religions practiced by Malaysia and New Zealand. 103 
While there are many alternative dimensions on which to differentiate cultures, based on the 104 
aforementioned use of practiced religion as a proxy gauge of culture, it can be justified for the 105 
intentions of this paper that New Zealand and Malaysian cultures are significantly different. 106 
 107 
------------------------------------------------------ 108 




A study by Goodwin and Goodwin (1999) invokes a framework devised by Hofstede (1980, 111 
1983) to compare the cultures of New Zealand and Malaysia.  They note the difficulty in 112 
assessing Malaysia’s culture due to its diverse ethnic mix. Hofstede’s framework has five 113 
cultural dimensions: (i) expectations of equality and willingness to challenge superiors; (ii) 114 
comfort with uncertainty and adherence to rules; (iii) individualism vs collectivism; (iv) 115 
aggressive vs supportive behaviour, and; (v) long term vs short term thinking.  Hofstede found 116 
that Malaysia has considerably lower expectations of equality and willingness to challenge 117 
superiors when compared to New Zealand, a slightly higher tendency towards uncertainty 118 
avoidance and a marginally more collectivist and supportive society.  Malaysia’s long-term vs 119 
short-term thinking was not included in the study. Goodwin and Goodwin’s study found that 120 
there were differences in responses to ethical issues among students between New Zealand and 121 
Malaysia    122 
 123 
2.2 The Malaysian construction industry 124 
Malaysia has a diverse construction workforce, being the most reliant on foreign workers in 125 
Asia (Pillai, 1999). 15.6% of the total Malaysian labour force is made up of immigrant workers 126 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2017b). These workers contribute to 69% of the labour 127 
used in the construction industry (Abdul-Rahman, Wang, Wood, & Low, 2012). This is a 128 
considerably higher proportion of foreign workers than the approx. 11% active in UK 129 
construction (Office for National Statistics, 2017) and  approx.19% in New Zealand (McLeod 130 
& Mare, 2013).  This 69% is suspected to be much higher due to construction industry growth 131 
in Malaysia, and the undocumented arrival of at least one million illegal immigrants (Abdul-132 
Rahman et al., 2012; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2010; Khan, Liew, & Ghazali, 2014; Salleh et al., 133 
2014). The majority of immigrants (62%) are Indonesian (Salleh et al., 2014).  134 
 
 
The presence of a vast foreign workforce presents a set of unique problems. These include, but 135 
are not limited to: the use of unskilled labour, repression of wages for local workers, 136 
commonplace practice of illegal activities, communication issues, and social problems (Abdul-137 
Rahman et al., 2012). 138 
 139 
2.3 The need and use of Safety Management Systems 140 
The need to effectively manage construction safety is imperative due to the potential impact on 141 
human life.  For some, keeping workers safe is as much about the economic impacts associated 142 
with the increasing costs of medical treatment, as it is the moral responsibility and duty of care 143 
placed on them (Hinze, Pedersen, & Fredley, 1998). Frequent and grave accidents can also 144 
have a serious impact on a construction company’s operations, thus again it becomes economic 145 
as well as ethical to manage safety properly (Wilson & Koehn, 2000).  146 
Accidents are controlled using safety management systems which are implemented through 147 
“policies, plans, procedures and processes” (Wachter & Yorio, 2014). Examples of these 148 
practices include, but are not limited to: guidelines, instructions, rules, safety toolbox talks, 149 
safety training, hazard management, safety inspections,  devolving power to safety officers, 150 
daily communication between supervisors and workers regarding safety, declaring safety a 151 
priority, greater engagement from senior management in safety, and thorough accident 152 
investigation procedures (Guo et al., 2015; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010). Koh and Rowlinson 153 
(2012) argue that these control-based practices are inadequate as they rely on error prevention 154 
and normative compliance. Furthermore, they suggest that focus on procedure compliance is 155 
at the expense of understanding the system holistically; such processes omit or overlook the 156 
key dynamic interactions between workers and their tasks in a wider context.  157 
 158 
2.4 Systems Thinking in safety 159 
 
 
Systems thinking is the general name given to an approach for managing problem situations 160 
that is different from, but complementary to the dominant approach.  There are many 161 
definitions and explanations of what constitutes systems thinking, but they are all similar in 162 
essence.  Von Bertalanffy (1968, p18) described the rise of the approach as a reaction to 163 
problems that were not suited to classical analysis.  He noted that the more traditional 164 
approaches required the interactions between parts to be negligible and the relations between 165 
the parts to be linear.  Modern complex systems did not fit these requirements.  Thus, methods 166 
which broke entities or issues into their simpler parts in order to study them in relative isolation 167 
under the assumption an understating of the whole could be extrapolated from this, were not 168 
suitable for these complex issues (Ackoff, 1979, 2001). The Royal Academy of Engineering 169 
explains: “A system is a set of parts which, when combined, have qualities that are not present 170 
in any of the parts themselves.  Those qualities are the emergent properties of the system” (The 171 
Royal Academy of Engineering 2007).  Systems thinking, embodied in various tools and 172 
methods, is therefore an approach for thinking about complex entities and issues as if they are 173 
a single intricate system with associated interconnections, emergent properties and non-linear 174 
behaviours.  175 
Early accident causation theory developed by Heinrich (1931) through his ‘domino’ 176 
theory suggests accidents are linear sequences of discrete actions, one causing the next, and 177 
that most accidents are rooted in human error. Reason (1997) significantly advanced the 178 
dominant model of accident causation to better encompass organisational accidents, through 179 
his ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (SCM). The SCM improved on previous developments as it took 180 
into account the effects of holistic factors in a larger system as well as including the idea of 181 
organisational defence layers (Reason, 1997). The model imagined defence layers as barriers 182 
between loss-causing hazards, with ‘holes’ in the defences allowing for accidents to occur. The 183 
SCM included the consideration of these holes forming due to “active failures” (mostly human 184 
 
 
factors) and “latent conditions” (mostly organisational factors). This more advanced model is 185 
limited, as pointed out by Reason himself, in that it is not sufficiently dynamic (Reason, 1997). 186 
The model is better represented by moving defence layers, which change on local conditions, 187 
and holes constantly changing in size - representing the ever-changing risks and contributing 188 
factors to accidents. 189 
Leveson (2011) suggested that such models are limited by their linear nature and 190 
presumption of a “root cause”. The inadequacy of assuming a root causes for an accident is 191 
that the choice of an “initial event” is subjective and thus a human decision, deeming activities 192 
preceding the “initial event” as irrelevant, has to be made (Leveson, 2011). Leveson also states 193 
that as real-life systems are constantly changing, linear models are not suitable as they have no 194 
provision for dynamic changes – they are not capable of capturing the complex nonlinear 195 
interactions between components in advanced socio-technical systems (Qureshi, 2007). For 196 
example, a supervisor instructing a worker to perform a task, then reviewing the progress of 197 
the task so that they can further instruct the worker creates a simple feedback loop that would 198 
not be adequately captured by these linear cause and effect models. 199 
Systemic accident analysis (SAA) arose from these acknowledged shortfalls in the form 200 
of various systems analysis methods. Examples such as Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling 201 
and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2011), Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 202 
(Hollnagel & Goteman, 2004) and Accimapping (Rasmussen, 1997) have been said to avoid 203 
some of the limitations of these more traditional approaches (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). 204 
Crucially, SAA views accidents as an “emergent phenomena”, resultant of the complex 205 
interaction of systems components (Qureshi, 2007), thus understanding the dynamic interacting 206 
nature of factors within these incidents is critical. 207 
STAMP is a control based theory that examines interactions between system 208 
components and views accidents as a result of inadequate control of these components 209 
 
 
(Leveson, 2011). FRAM constructs a network of interrelating subsystems, with the behaviour 210 
of any one system component able to ‘resonate’ with that of others. Such resonance within 211 
components can result in dramatic system-level variation that pushes it out of control and to 212 
the point where an accident develops (Hollnagel, 2012). Accimap is a model that links failures 213 
across six socio-technical system levels (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012), based on 214 
Rasmussen’s socio-technical framework (Rasmussen, 1997). A cause-consequence chart is 215 
used to analyse cause events and link different factors across the various system levels 216 
(Qureshi, 2007). While these SAA methods are widely used in accident analysis (specifically 217 
STAMP and Accimap) (Salmon et al., 2012), they are considered as “resource intensive” as 218 
well as requiring “considerable amounts of domain and theoretical knowledge to apply” 219 
(Underwood & Waterson, 2013). 220 
System dynamics was first pioneered by Forrester (Forrester, 1961) and was developed 221 
into a methodology for understanding “the structure and dynamics of complex systems” 222 
(Sterman, 2000).  It embodies, and is to some synonymous with, systems thinking. The notion 223 
that systems thinking can be used to interpret intricate systems was echoed by Checkland 224 
(1981), who stated that systems thinking was “the use of a particular set of ideas, systems ideas, 225 
in trying to understand the world’s complexity” (Checkland, 1981). Furthermore, system 226 
dynamics related methods – namely causal loop diagrams (see Figure 1a and Figure 1b) – may 227 
be better suited for the problems associated with traditional accident models as they emphasise 228 
the circular nature of complex systems - there is “no difference between cause and effect” (Goh, 229 
Brown, & Spickett, 2010). Causal loop diagrams can be used to create generic and frequently 230 
occurring system structures to describe common behaviours, called system archetypes, which 231 
are useful to identify points of leverage for change (Goh et al., 2010). These system archetypes 232 
can be viewed as “classifying structures responsible for generic patterns of behaviour over 233 
time” (E F Wolstenholme, 2003). 234 
 
 
Systems thinking is suitable to understand the complexity (Checkland, 1981; Maani & 235 
Maharaj, 2004; Sterman, 2000) presented by construction accidents while system archetypes 236 
provide a concise way to visualise the complexity (Goh et al., 2010). 237 
 238 
2.5 Study aims 239 
As outlined in the previous section, the of use systems thinking in relation to safety is an 240 
effective way to conceptualise the complex issues present. It also provides a platform from 241 
which further safety improvements in the construction sector can be made (P. Mitropoulos, 242 
Abdelhamid, & Howell, 2005). Guo et al. (2015) asserted the pertinent point of needing to fully 243 
understand the interdependence of system factors, through the exploration of the linking 244 
behavioural system components that make them up.  245 
Guo et al.’s (2015) research consisted of the creation of 8 ‘system archetypes’ describing 246 
behaviour patterns characteristic of construction safety. Following the dictionary definition of 247 
an archetype being “something that is considered to be a perfect or typical example of a 248 
particular kind of person or thing, because it has all their most important characteristics” 249 
(Collins English Dictionary, 2018), it is inferred that the system archetypes proposed by Guo 250 
et al. (2015) should be applicable in any context. Guo et al. (2015) recognised the limitations 251 
of claiming to have identified archetypes, in that future research would be needed to establish 252 
their presence in “different cultural settings” for this to truly be the case. Thus, the aims of this 253 
study therefore are: 254 
1. Establish the main factor or factors that contribute to construction accidents in 255 
Malaysia. 256 
2. Evaluate and validate the grounded theory method devised by Guo et al. by utilising it 257 
in a new context. 258 
 
 
3. By applying the method, independently develop and test potential archetypes present 259 
in the ‘different cultural context’ of the Malaysian construction industry. Doing so 260 
will potentially identify new archetypes, as well confirm whether Guo et al.’s models 261 
are truly archetypal.  262 
 263 
3. Method 264 
 265 
3.1 Creating construction safety archetypes 266 
System archetypes can be represented through causal feedback loops. These are visual 267 
representations of the causal influences between contributing factors.  The causal influences 268 
are represented by arrows between named variables.  The arrows between the variables in 269 
feedback loops are marked either positive (‘+’) or negative (‘-’). A positive arrow (positive 270 
polarity) means that the linked variables change in the same direction (e.g. if the parent variable 271 
decreases, the child variable will also decrease or if the parent variable were to increase, it 272 
would cause the child variable to increase).  A negative arrow (negative polarity) describes a 273 
relationship between variables such that they are opposed (e.g. if the parent variable increases, 274 
the child variable will decrease and vice-versa). These two types of causal connection can 275 
combine to form two types of feedback loop representing either reinforcing or balancing 276 
relationships. Reinforcing loops (Figure 1a) act to exponentially increase (for an ascending 277 
trend) or decrease (for a descending trend) the effects of a phenomenon, with the rate of 278 
increase also inflating exponentially. Balancing loops (Figure 1b) act to close the gap between 279 
the current state and the desired state via some process or action (Guo et al., 2015), resisting 280 
change and attempting to maintain the status quo.  281 
------------------------------------------------------ 282 





Senge (1990) used this modelling approach to represent archetypal causal structures that 286 
underpin organisational issues, subsequently reinterpreted and developed by Marais et al 287 
(2006) into system safety-specific archetypes.  Such system archetypes are fundamental to 288 
system dynamics modelling (Eric F. Wolstenholme, 2004).  Construction safety archetypes 289 
then are simply system safety archetypes applied in the context of construction. They are 290 
intended to describe the causal structures that result in individual safety issues, rather than the 291 
whole system.  292 
The first step in developing such representation involves the identification of the themes 293 
relating to an issue; the key variables associated with each theme or problem are also 294 
established (Guo et al., 2015).  The second step requires the generalisation of these variables 295 
such that they are no longer event-specific, instead describing a generic pattern of behaviour, 296 
by exploring their causal affiliation with each other (Guo et al., 2015).  297 
 298 
3.2 Grounded Theory for data collection 299 
 Grounded Theory, conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), is a methodology for 300 
creating theory that is “grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed” (Strauss & 301 
Corbin, 1994). As part of the process, Grounded Theory stipulates an analysis of constant 302 
comparison of data sources and of theory to data in order to identify emergent concepts (Glaser 303 
& Strauss, 1967). Thus, based on Grounded Theory, concurrent data collection, data analysis, 304 
archetype development, and constant comparison of data and models is performed. The data, 305 
in this case from interviews, is analysed and progressively abstracted such that it is described 306 
in terms of higher-order categories. The process as applied here is described in the subsequent 307 




3.3 Interview structure, sample strategy, and sample participants 310 
Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted (i.e. there was a predefined set of questions, 311 
but participants were able to deviate from those and talk freely).  Semi-structured interviews 312 
are “particularly effective” as a method of gathering data when developing causal diagrams 313 
(Sterman, 2000).  Interviews focused on identifying the main safety themes through broad 314 
questions, spanning a multitude of topics. When a new theme revealed itself, further questions 315 
were directed on that specific line of thought. Due to the concurrent nature of data collection 316 
and analysis when utilising Grounded Theory, pointed questions were formulated between 317 
interviews, based on previous respondents, about specific safety topics. These questions were 318 
then asked to subsequent interviewees after they had referenced the relevant topic.  319 
 The precedent in Grounded Theory sampling is to employ sampling techniques 320 
sequentially (known as directed sampling) as data is collected and the theoretical model 321 
becomes focused (Bryant, Charmaz, & EDITORS, 2010). The techniques that are typically 322 
employed are (sequentially): convenience sampling, purposeful sampling, and theoretical 323 
sampling (Bryant et al., 2010). However, due to the time constraints of this study, only 324 
convenience sampling was carried out. This meant that participants were selected on the basis 325 
of accessibility, but did provide a large wealth of knowledge based on their considerable 326 
collective experience. Bryant et al. (2010) state the necessity of having “excellent participants 327 
to obtain excellent data”. An excellent participant must: have experience of the phenomena 328 
under study, be willing to participate, give enough time to fully explain their experience, and 329 
be articulate and reflective (Bryant et al., 2010). The participants of this study fulfil those 330 
criteria. All participants were fluent in English, and willingly volunteered at least 30 minutes 331 
of their time (mean interview length: 45 minutes). Only one interview was not conducted face-332 





TABLE 3  336 
------------------------------------------------------ 337 
 338 
3.4 Data analysis – Inductive System Diagrams 339 
Inductive system diagram (ISD) methodology is one in which causal loop diagrams can be 340 
constructed through concept development of field data (Burchill & Fine, 1997). It utilises the 341 
grounded theory method to develop key variables that are closely linked to the data. Following 342 
this, the ISD methodology allows for these key variables to be causally linked via causal loop 343 
diagrams (Burchill & Fine, 1997). Thus, the causal loop diagrams (and resulting archetypes) 344 
are markedly ‘grounded’ in the data collected, lending to their validity. The development 345 
process of ISD methodology, adapted for the creation of a system archetype, is outlined in 346 
Figure 2. 347 
 348 
3.5 Coding techniques 349 
The standard grounded theory method for processing interview data was followed. This 350 
consisted of three ‘coding’ stages. The first was ‘open coding’, in which interview 351 
transcriptions were processed line-by-line, tagging data as ‘nodes’. Nodes can be thought of as 352 
folders representing an event, theme, or behaviour, which were filled with quotes taken from 353 
the raw data. These quotes are ‘coded’ under a specific node. Nodes describing similar events, 354 
variables, or topics were then grouped to form key themes – this allowed for the main safety 355 
themes to be identified. As this process was carried out, memos were taken as insight into the 356 
topic was gained and new theories began to formulate. 357 
 
 
Upon the initial identification of a safety theme the second stage - ‘selective coding’ - 358 
was performed. Interview data was analysed by studying the events and ideas mentioned by 359 
participants to understand the behaviour patterns that they were speaking about, and determine 360 
under which themes these behaviours occur. This also allowed the determination of causal 361 
relationships between variables by utilising an adjacency matrix, which explored the affiliation 362 
between variables and whether the effect one had on another was positive or negative. Based 363 
on these causal links, word-arrow diagrams and self-contained causal loops were created. 364 
‘Theoretical coding’ is the final stage of the process. Theoretical coding allowed for the 365 
fabrication of safety archetypes by consolidating the feedback loops created in selective coding. 366 
Related feedback loops were gathered under a single safety theme, creating a generic causal 367 
loop describing a set of patterns of behaviour – a safety archetype. The safety archetypes were 368 
validated against the collected data through constant comparison. All coding was performed 369 
using the software package NVIVO, developed for such analysis. 370 
 371 
------------------------------------------------------ 372 
FIGURE 2  373 
------------------------------------------------------ 374 
 375 
3.6 Establishing causal relationships from data 376 
Exemplification of the process carried out in creating causal loop diagrams from interview data 377 
is outlined in Table 4. Open coding was used to tag the quotes shown under various themes 378 
(quotes can be tagged under more than one theme). Selective coding then allowed for the causal 379 
relationship between these themes to be explored, and the creation of causal links following 380 









Selective coding is used to combine the causal links shown in Table 4 to form a causal loop, as 388 
seen in Figure 3. Multiple feedback loops like this are then integrated together to create a 389 
system archetype by utilising theoretical coding. The quotes shown in Table 4 did not all come 390 
from the same source, highlighting the complex nature of construction behaviour and the lack 391 
of holistic knowledge possessed by members in the system. Causal arrows bisected by two 392 
parallel lines show a relationship that has a delay. 393 
 394 
------------------------------------------------------ 395 
FIGURE 3  396 
------------------------------------------------------ 397 
 398 
4. Results 399 
 400 
The interviews and open coding processes revealed a multitude of behaviours, which were 401 
grouped into nodes, safety themes, and then eventually combined to form safety archetypes as 402 
shown in Table 5.  403 
 404 
------------------------------------------------------ 405 





Each of the archetypes mentioned above will be explored in-depth, and leverage points (places 409 
to intervene in the system to counter unwanted behaviour) identified. Quotes from interviewees 410 
are included in italics. 411 
 412 
4.1 Effects of a migrant workforce 413 
Figure 4 shows a construction safety archetype relating to the workforce employed in 414 
Malaysian construction. A main safety theme of this archetype is the inadequacy of the 415 
workforce (S2); generally speaking, workers struggle to safely carry out a variety of 416 
construction activities. Another contributing factor is the unique communication challenges 417 
introduced by the use of a foreign workforce. 418 
 419 
------------------------------------------------------ 420 
FIGURE 4  421 
------------------------------------------------------ 422 
 423 
The prevalence of a foreign workforce is the consequence of various factors, including a 424 
shortage of local labour (Salleh et al., 2014) and the perception among Malaysians of 425 
construction industry being “dirty, difficult and dangerous” (Wong & Yazdanifard, 2015). 426 
However, labourers in this workforce are often untrained, as multiple interviewees echoed the 427 
sentiment of the following quote: “A general worker on a construction site – they have no 428 
training”. The ‘communication issues in training’ (R3) reinforcing loop has a direct effect on 429 
the ‘unforeseen impacts of communication issues’ (R4) reinforcing loop. Due to the 430 
communication issues presented by a foreign workforce, it is significantly harder to train them. 431 
This has a reinforcing effect as training would reduce the communication problems 432 
 
 
experienced. Many interviewees noted both the contractor’s and client’s overriding drive for 433 
profit - “The majority of contractors within Malaysia ... they don’t really care about the 434 
workers, it’s about turnover profit and margins”. This means that training is often ignored as 435 
it is perceived cheaper to continuously hire new workers as compared to training the whole 436 
workforce. However, this perception is incorrect as noted by an interviewee: “training people 437 
to do the job means that they will do the job more safely and more quickly”. This is depicted 438 
by the ‘creation of an unskilled workforce’ (R2) loop; untrained staff are more likely to be 439 
involved in accidents, after which they are replaced by new, similarly unskilled workers – 440 
perpetuating the cycle. The ‘disregard for safety procedure’ (R1) reinforcing loop shows a 441 
common vicious cycle that is cultivated in Malaysian construction. Schedule delays are 442 
inevitably incurred when accidents happen, resulting in slowed progress. The stagnation of 443 
production progress generates an increased cost to the contractor which, as previously 444 
discussed, is the antithesis to their project goal - make the most money possible. This means 445 
that the production pressure on site is increased to try to make up for this lost time. Increased 446 
production pressure then often leads to safety practices being ignored in favour of quicker 447 
work, which inevitably results in more unsafe behaviours and accidents - “[upon the 448 
occurrence of delays, site managers] scream at their workers, who are just general workers, 449 
and health and safety goes out the window”. 450 
 451 
Leverage points  452 
Moving Malaysia away from an unskilled foreign workforce would help to alleviate a number 453 
of construction safety issues in the country. However, the problem of the migrant workforce is 454 
not one that can be solved quickly nor easily, and for broader national and industry factors may 455 
not even be feasible, thus it will be more suitable to focus on the training provided to these 456 
labourers. Providing translated training courses and general communications training for 457 
 
 
employees that are not proficient in the local language will reduce problems associated with 458 
work orders and skills training. This will also reduce the reliance on a lingua franca with which 459 
verbal exchange is often misinterpreted. These steps will help to combat the negative 460 
behaviours of (R3) and (R4) reinforcing loops. Furthermore, the introduction of the balancing 461 
loop shown in Figure 5 will aid in alleviating the negative impacts of the reinforcing loop (R1). 462 




FIGURE 5 467 
------------------------------------------------------ 468 
 469 
4.2 Corporate accountability and profit driven business culture 470 
Figure 6 shows a construction safety archetype describing behaviours exhibited by clients and 471 
contractors at the highest levels of Malaysian construction. One of the main themes of this 472 
archetype is that the foreign workforce is held with such little regard (S2) that it is almost 473 
viewed as dispensable. This means that even when accidents occur, they have little to no effect 474 
on contractors and clients. 475 
 476 
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 480 
The ‘person approach’ (B1) and ‘side effect of person approach’ (R1) are loops forming the 481 
“Blame on workers” archetype devised by Guo et al. (2015). Blaming workers reduces unsafe 482 
 
 
behaviours in the short term as it prevents minor transgressions and promotes procedural 483 
adherence. However, it also means more fundamental root causes and latent failures in the 484 
system go unidentified, as well as the procedures that prompted the transgressions – ultimately 485 
leading to the accident rate increasing. This archetype was determined to also occur in 486 
Malaysian construction but as can be seen, has an array of other feedback loops associated with 487 
it that are not present in Guo et al.’s research.  488 
Furthermore, the tendency to blame workers is facilitated by the nature of the 489 
workforce; being made up of a migrant (often illegal) majority whom are offered little 490 
protection, particularly in the case of illegal workers – “you often hear: “it was the dumb 491 
migrants fault, he didn’t listen to me, and that’s why this accident has happened”. They’ve 492 
become the scapegoat, so there’s no accountability.” This leads into the ‘value placed on 493 
workforce’ (R2) reinforcing loop, in which limited accountability for accidents leads to the 494 
propensity of disregarding the safety of the foreign workforce. Interview data has indicated that 495 
foreign workers are already held in low regard by the contractors managing them – “the 496 
Indonesians are just looked down on by everybody, same with the Bangladeshis, and same with 497 
the Pakistanis” due to a myriad of culture factors (not featured in the archetype). This allows 498 
contractors to “get away with accidents”, further lowering the value placed on the workforce. 499 
Intuitively this will influence the safety culture on site, which will affect the unsafe behaviours 500 
(and therefore accidents) that occur. The ‘no training for workers’ (R3) reinforcing loop shows 501 
the ease at which workers are terminated from Malaysian construction sites. Blaming workers 502 
for accidents increases the workforce turnover, which leads to a decrease in training as 503 
contractors don’t believe in investing in a workforce that is quick to turnover – “the turnover 504 
of staff reduces the willingness of contractors to train them – it’s money down the drain”. 505 
 506 
Leverage points 507 
 
 
The common practice of blaming workers to reduce unsafe behaviours is clearly shown to be 508 
an ineffective safety management strategy; the loops (R1), (R2), and (R3) exhibit the ways in 509 
which this method is flawed. The simplest way to mitigate the negative impacts of these loops 510 
would be to eliminate the practice of blaming workers. This may be difficult to achieve due to 511 
construction management’s reluctance to take ownership of accidents, as it is often easier and 512 
cheaper to terminate workers than to change working procedures and pay accident related fines. 513 
A change in regulation to allow more blame to be attributed to employing organisations, and 514 
heavier fines for infractions, would force a shift in the priorities held by construction managers. 515 
However, the problems associated with increased regulation (discussed in section 4.3) would 516 
have to be addressed. 517 
 518 
4.3 Issues in the regulatory system 519 
Figure 7 shows a construction safety archetype describing behaviour shown by Malaysian 520 
regulators and legislators. It is a modified version of Senge’s “fixes that fail” archetype (Senge, 521 
1990). The main theme of this archetype is the effect that enforcement has on safety 522 
performance. Analysis has suggested that enforcement of regulation is extremely poor in 523 
Malaysia, to the extent that contractors are comfortable in taking risk to avoid compliance with 524 
regulation in an attempt to save cost.  525 
 526 
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 530 
The ‘penalisation inducing corruption’ balancing loop (B3) demonstrates the ability of 531 
contractors/clients to avoid penalisation for noncompliance. This is enabled by the 532 
 
 
susceptibility of governmental agents to bribes and pressure from those in positions of power. 533 
“Corruption is rife, and with that there’s always the opportunity for something to be covered 534 
up or paid off”. The construction industry has been identified as “the most corrupt sector in the 535 
world” (de Jong, Henry, & Stansbury, 2009); coupling this with Malaysia’s reputation as a 536 
place rife with corruption (Alam Siddiquee, 2006), it is no surprise that corruption plays a large 537 
role in the Malaysian construction industry. The ability to avoid penalties is exploited by 538 
contractors as a way to evade costly compliance with regulation, as they know that they will 539 
not be penalised; “Inspectors can be paid off if they do go and find something”. This effect is 540 
carried into the ‘effect of penalty on safety performance’ (B2) balancing loop in which the 541 
avoidance of penalties induces a lower level of safety motivation and then performance - 542 
leading to more accidents. The ‘performance reducing budget’ (B1) balancing loop shows the 543 
delayed effect that safety performance has on budgeting. However, safety budget is often cut 544 
regardless of performance in an attempt to gain better profit margins – “The contractor is 545 
always trying to look for ways to get higher profit, so they tend to cut, cut, cut safety budget.” 546 
– thus further impacting loop (B2). The ‘safety performance’ (B4) balancing loop shows the 547 
interconnected nature of performance and legislation. However, it must be noted that 548 
interviewees have detailed a marked inflexibility in government regarding the change of 549 
legislation, meaning that causal link between safety performance and legislation is weak – “To 550 
actually make that [legislative] change would take an additional workload for somebody, are 551 
they willing to do that? From what I’m seeing, I don’t see a willingness to change” 552 
 553 
Leverage points 554 
The problem of legislative enforcement is one that was often mentioned by interviewees. As 555 
mentioned above, corruption is a large contributing factor to the lack of enforcement, however 556 
it is also affected by Malaysia’s low governmental safety budget. In combination, these factors 557 
 
 
lead to a void in the enforcement of regulation, which is exploited by contractors to cut corners 558 
and utilise unsafe practices. To reduce these practices, loop (B3) needs to be opposed. This 559 
could be done through the introduction of policies that improve the transparency of 560 
construction transactions, particularly those paid to governmental agencies. Transparent 561 
actions would discourage government officials from accepting bribery payments as it would 562 
be easier to recognise corrupt activities. 563 
 564 
5. Discussion 565 
The three ‘construction safety archetypes’ detailed indicate patterns of behaviour, and the 566 
causal structures that produce them, at different hierarchical levels of the Malaysian 567 
construction industry.  568 
The ‘effects of a migrant workforce’, ‘corporate accountability and profit driven 569 
business culture’, and ‘issues in the regulatory system’ archetypes show behaviour at site 570 
management, senior management, and governmental levels, respectively – each subsequent 571 
model serves to contextualise the previous one. These models describe the underlying 572 
behavioural structures found in Malaysia, indicating why certain construction behaviours are 573 
observed. Using systems thinking in this context allows for a greater understanding of the 574 
complex interconnectivity of management decisions and systems throughout hierarchical 575 
levels. Furthermore, these archetypes reveal causal relationships that are not obvious, allowing 576 
for an analysis of procedures and their effects that would have otherwise thought to be unrelated 577 
or counterintuitive. For example, the ‘effects of a migrant workforce’ archetype reveals an 578 
unlikely causal link in which the communication issues presented by a foreign workforce 579 
eventually leads to more foreign workers being hired (reinforcing loop ‘unforeseen impacts of 580 
communication issues’ (R4)). This example shows the strength of dynamic system analysis to 581 
fully identify all of a systems characteristics.  582 
 
 
 Rasmussen (1997) attributed certain major accidents to a “systematic migration of 583 
organisational behaviour toward accident under the influence of pressure toward cost-584 
effectiveness in an aggressive, competitive environment”. This was developed by Dekker 585 
(2016) who coined the concept of “drift into failure” in which organisations develop routines 586 
based on balancing productivity and safety, such that failures become a by-product of the 587 
system itself, rather than based on the decisions of individuals within the system (Dekker, 588 
2016). These concepts are exhibited in the archetypes, particularly in the loops ‘disregard for 589 
safety procedure’ (R1), ‘value placed on workforce’ (R2), and ‘penalisation inducing 590 
corruption’ (B3) from each archetype respectively. These loops show routine behaviour that is 591 
not internally viewed as a contributing factor to unsafe behaviour, but undoubtedly has an 592 
effect.  593 
 The archetypes support Guo et al.’s (2015) assertions that safety management systems 594 
are unable to cope with the dynamic nature of the problem, and that safety considerations need 595 
to be integrated into all areas of a business. This is exemplified by the ‘no training for workers’ 596 
(R3) reinforcing loop in which there is no consideration of potential employees’ skills when 597 
hiring new staff. However, in addressing study aim 3, Guo et al.’s (2015) archetypes have been 598 
proven to not be truly archetypal - they do not apply in all contexts. The archetype ‘corporate 599 
accountability and profit driven business culture’ demonstrates this. Whilst it shares the 600 
characteristics of the ‘person approach’ (B1) and ‘side effect of person approach’ (R1) loops 601 
with the identically named loops of Guo et al.’s (2015) “Blame on workers” archetype, the 602 
“Blame on workers” archetype excludes novel factors that occur outside of New Zealand. The 603 
presence of a lowly-valued migrant workforce presents a new dynamic effect for the variable 604 
‘blame on workers’, in which workers are dispensable, thus raising issues of accountability that 605 
could only arise in such a context.  606 
 
 
 The grounded theory method proved to be effective in data collection and analysis. The 607 
utilisation of constant comparison allowed for theory to naturally emerge from the data and 608 
helped to direct questioning in further interviews, contributing to underdeveloped areas in the 609 
theory. Furthermore, grounded theory facilitated the creation of models that were directly 610 
related to the data collected, lending to their validity. 611 
5.1 Malaysian Construction Behaviour 612 
The client and contractors overriding drive for profit, through cost-cutting and progress 613 
motivated working procedures, was a principal factor that was unanimously mentioned by 614 
interviewees, but was not included explicitly in the archetypes themselves. It was excluded 615 
because it was intrinsic in the majority of variables, meaning that its inclusion would lead to 616 
its effect being double counted. The bulk of decisions taken by contractors are in regard to this 617 
sole interest, presenting the systemic, cultural problem that faces Malaysian construction. This 618 
behaviour is facilitated by a myriad of factors that occur in the Malaysian construction industry, 619 
including the ability to disregard the lives of foreign workers. A phrase that was often used by 620 
interviewees, in reference to labourers, was that of “life is cheap” - “I think life is cheap because 621 
its immigrant labour – it’s not as close to heart”. Other factors that allow for the uncontentious 622 
ethos of profit driven business to thrive include, but are not limited to: the ability to corrupt 623 
government officials, the lack of enforcement of safety regulation, the availability of new 624 
migrant labourers, the lack of accountability for accidents at the management level, the 625 
weakness of safety regulation (“[after a fatal accident] a RM50,000 fine. That’s the price of a 626 
human here. A slap on the wrist and off you go.”), high risk projects, and the use of unskilled 627 
labourers. A systemic moral permutation away from the industry’s profit related objectives - 628 
into goals that have a recognition of the distinct social responsibilities the industry carries - is 629 
required to combat these issues. 630 
 
 
These views must also be considered in the broader context of Malaysian culture, and 631 
in relation to the aims of this study, its comparison to New Zealand culture.  Despite arguing 632 
that their cultures are different, an archetypal causal structure appears to have been identified 633 
that is present in both. This invites further consideration of the similarities and differences 634 
between their cultures.  The detail of this ethnography is beyond the scope of the paper and 635 
indeed the expertise of its authors. It is therefore recommended as further work in addition to 636 
the discussions in following sub-section.  637 
 Nevertheless, it is interesting to briefly reflect on the differences in customs and other 638 
social behaviours that might warrant further investigation. Building on the point above, the 639 
statistical value of a life has been estimated through meta-study (Miller, 2000) at around $1.6m 640 
(baselined to 1995 values) in New Zealand and $600,000 in Malaysia.  This is approximately 641 
$2.7m and $1m today. Worksafe, the New Zealand health and safety regulator recently fined a 642 
construction company NZ$351,563 and NZ$177,735 reparations. In total this is approximately 643 
RM1.4m or 28x the reported Malaysian fine.     644 
 645 
5.2 Limitations and future research 646 
This research has various limitations. Firstly, it was not feasible in thus study to carry out fully 647 
exploratory Grounded Theory. Data collection was limited to 7 interviews, less than the 20-30 648 
participants recommended for Grounded Theory (Creswell, 2007), but not dissimilar to the 649 
number of participants used in other studies to produce safety-related causal loop models (e.g. 650 
the 7 interviwees of Kwesi-Buor, Menachof, & Talas, 2019) .  Nor is it dissimilar to the number 651 
of participants in the more common group model building mode (e.g. the avergae of 7 652 
particpants found in 15 qualitative and 19 quantitative studies by Rouwette, Vennix, & 653 
Mullekom, 2002).  It does however mean that, similar to Guo et al. (2015), the ‘archetypes’ 654 
formulated in this paper may not be truly archetypal, as under the Grounded Theory approach 655 
 
 
data collection did not reach the point of saturation.  Furthermore, no interviews were 656 
conducted with labourers themselves, only management staff. Whilst this gave perspective to 657 
behaviours beyond the ‘coalface’, it excludes the unique viewpoint of the migrant workforce. 658 
However, the paper aimed to independently develop casual loop models within a different 659 
cultural context in order to test whether Guo et.al.’s models were truly archetypal.   With the 660 
discovery of the of the ‘corporate accountability and profit driven business culture’ model the 661 
study is able to provide evidence to support their claim even with a smaller sample size.  Hence 662 
the smaller number of participants is not a limitation on this aim.  Nor is it a limitation on the 663 
ability to achieve the study’s humbler aim of verifying that the process can produce such 664 
structures.  The limited number of participants does limit the ability to claim that the two 665 
additional structures are archetypal or even complete, however the fact that they emerged from 666 
interviews with the seven participants still suggests that other structures other causal loop 667 
structures and indeed other archetypes may exist.  This would require a larger sample size.  668 
It is stated that, for Grounded Theory, “the investigator needs to set aside […] 669 
theoretical ideas or notions so that the analytic, substantive theory can emerge” (Creswell, 670 
2007). However, due to the nature of this study – developing Guo et al.’s (2015) theory – there 671 
may have been pre-existing theoretical notions based on the prior research influencing the 672 
method. 673 
As the construction safety archetypes created in this paper are partially informed by 674 
Senge’s (1990) generic archetypes, criticism that is placed on Senge’s work can also be 675 
applicable to this research. It can be scrutinised according to analytical flaws; Senge relies on 676 
an inadequate definition of structure that “cannot explain the organizing practices and learning 677 




Future research within the Malaysian (and other nations) construction industry is 680 
needed to identify further construction safety archetypes. Furthermore, future research could 681 
focus on a different method of archetype construction/data collection, rather than the Grounded 682 
Theory based approach employed here.  683 
 684 
5.3 Conclusions 685 
This paper sought to identify the main factors affecting the safety of the construction industry 686 
in Malaysia. A series of interviews, and subsequent data analysis, illuminated the role of the 687 
migrant workforce, safety procedures, and governance of a profit driven industry. The 688 
Grounded Theory approach used by Guo et al. (2015) was partially validated in that it allowed 689 
for the underlying behavioural structures in the construction industry to be revealed and 690 
articulated as causal loops.  It was also possible to identify corrective leverage points from 691 
these structures, establishing potential methods to reduce the unwanted behaviours displayed. 692 
The ‘corporate accountability and profit driven business culture’ archetype revealed a 693 
similar structure to the “Blame on workers” archetype created by Guo et al., suggesting that 694 
this may indeed be archetypal. This study was also able contextualise the ‘corporate 695 
accountability and profit driven business culture’ archetype in the broader issues of the 696 
Malaysian construction industry.  697 
The other structures identified in this study differed significantly from those created by 698 
Guo et al.  This does not suggest that Guo et al.’s structures are not truly archetypal but indicates 699 
that additional construction safety archetypes may exist.   700 
 701 
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Table 1: Fatality rates for different countries/regions (Takala 1999, Ministry of Business 894 
Innovation & Employment 2013, Department of Occupational Safety and Health 2017, 895 
Department of Statistics Malaysia 2017a, Worksafe New Zealand 2017) 896 
Region 
Annual average fatal 
occupational accident 
rate (per 100,000) 
Country 
Average construction 
fatality rate from 




23.12 New Zealand 13.45 
European 
Union 
6.10 Malaysia 35.14 
 897 
 898 
Table 2: Religions practiced in New Zealand and Malaysia (Department of Statistics 899 
Malaysia, 2011; Stats NZ, 2014) 900 
 Religion practiced (% of population) 






48 1.2 1.5 2.1 41.9 5.3 
Malaysia 9.2 61.3 19.8 6.3 0.7 3.4 
 901 
 902 
Table 3: Participant occupation and experience 903 
Participant number Job title 
Years of experience in 
Asia (in Malaysia) 
1 
HSE Risk Professional - 
Southeast Asia 
15 (3) 
2 Head of HSE 13 (6) 
3 Senior Project Manager 19 (1.5) 
4 HSE Manager 17 (14) 
5 CEO (of construction company) 16 (12) 
6 Property Development Manager 5 (3) 





Table 4: Process of fabricating causal links from interview data 906 
Quote Cause Effect  +/- Causal Links 
“The contactor, 
they always blame 
the workers.” 
 




“After an accident, 
the workers, they 
get canned straight 
away. The 
companies do that, 
the blame gets 










definitely has an 
effect on a 
contractor’s 
willingness to train. 
Without a doubt. 







“Training people to 
do the job means 
that they will do the 

















Accidents Blame on workers
+
Blame on workers Turnover of staff
+






Table 5: The nodes and safety themes that the safety archetypes are composed of 917 
Safety Archetype (A) Safety Theme (S) Nodes (N) 
Effects of a migrant 
workforce (A1) 
Foreign workers (S1) Use of foreign workers (N1) 
Illegal workforce (N2) 
Communication issues (N3) 
Inadequate workforce (S2)  Uneducated workforce (N4) 
Lack of training (N5) 
Poorly paid workforce (N6) 





Construction industry factors 
(S3) 
Workers’ top priority is 
income (N10) 
Subcontractor driven market 
(N11) 
Site factors (N12) 
Corporate accountability and 
profit driven business culture 
(A2) 
Emphasis on health and 
safety (S4) 
Health and safety is not a 
priority (N13)  
Lack of safety culture (N14) 
Life is cheap (N15) 
Health and safety is simply 
‘box ticking’ (N16) 
Organisational 
practices/views on health and 
safety (S5) 




Lack of training (N19)  
Desire to avoid regulation 
(N20) 
Lack of risk awareness by 
management (N21) 
Poor construction equipment 
(N22) 
Lack of caring culture (S6) (Client/contractor) Drive for 
profit (N23) 
No regard for foreign 
workers (N24) 
Life is cheap (N15) 
Cultural factors (N25) 
Accountability of 
client/contractor (N26) 
Blame on workers (N27) 
Issues in the regulatory 
system (A3) 
Legislation and enforcement 
issues (S7) 
Poor enforcement of 
regulation (N28) 
Lack of budget for health and 
safety authorities (N29) 
 
 
Poor legislation (N30) 





Reactive decisions (N33)  
 918 
  919 
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Figure 1a: Example reinforcing loop Figure 1b: Example balancing loop 
 
 
  933 
































































































































Effect of penalty on
safety performance
B3
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